Migration and Children\u27s School and Labor: Evidence from El Salvador by Intemann, Zachary
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Master's Theses Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects
Spring 3-12-2013
Migration and Children's School and Labor:
Evidence from El Salvador
Zachary Intemann
zpintemann@usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/thes
Part of the International Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @
Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Intemann, Zachary, "Migration and Children's School and Labor: Evidence from El Salvador" (2013). Master's Theses. 63.
https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/63
 Migration and Children’s Schooling and Labor: 
Evidence from El Salvador 
 
Master’s Thesis 




Department of Economics 
University of San Francisco 
2130 Fulton St. 





  Abstract: This paper examines the impact of parental migration on schooling outcomes 
for children left behind in El Salvador. Using cross sectional data collected in 2012, 
outcomes for children are observed for children with migrant parents; the outcomes are 
also analyzed by gender of the migrant parent who left his or her child behind. With 
instrumental variables estimations, as well as a seemingly unrelated regression to estimate 
the impact of migration on a child’s time allocation, observations are also compared by 
subsample to examine the impact of the presence or absence of remittances in the 
household when a parent has migrated. Results show that children with a migrant parent 
will complete more years of school, more so if the migrant is a mother. Migration has no 
significant influence on time allocation, except in the absence of remittances, which can 
cause a child to work more and study less. This paper studies the impact of both migration 
and remittances on a child’s schooling behavior. Results suggest that the same factors that 
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 Section I: Introduction 
               El Salvador’s greatest esport is people, while its primary import is remittances. In fact,  
remittances in El Salvador exceed the amount of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
make up approximately 18% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is a result of the 
estimated 35% to 45% of total Salvadoran population that emigrates (Gammage, 2006).  
According to 2010 US Census data, more than 1.6 million Salvadorans reside in the United 
States, an increase from 655,165 in 2000 and these numbers are likely underestimates. The 
number of Salvadoran citizens in the United States represents around a quarter of the total 
population in El Salvador.  Thus, there are many Salvadoran parents living in the United 
States, and having a migrant parent away may have consequences for the child left behind.  
              How does having a migrant parent abroad affect children’s schooling? The common 
hypothesis for migration and education is that a member of the household migrates, works, and 
sends home money to assist the family income. Thus, children in the family will be able to 
attend school, either by having the money to afford school uniform or by no longer risking the 
opportunity cost of work instead of school. One the other hand, a missing parent can cause 
emotional damage or behavioral issues for a child; migration may result in a child being 
unsupervised, unprotected, and potentially poorly behaved (de la Garza, 2010). A lack of 
parental supervision could be harmful to a child’s schooling. In addition migration can also 
decrease the amount of available labor in the household, which could cause a child to work 
more and deter him or her from attending school.  
                 This paper will use two estimation methods: an instrumental variable estimation to 
measure the impact of parental migration on completed years of schooling, and a seemingly 
unrelated regression model for time allocated to school and labor by children. The first 
independent variable of interest will be a dummy indicating if the child has a parent who has 
migrated and lives away. Children will be observed by comparing different samples depending 
on if a child lives in a household that receives remittances from any source or not. Observations 
will also be interpreted by compare effects of mothers who have migrated and fathers who have 
migrated on their children. Children with migrant parents will complete a fraction more of a 
year of completed school than children who do not have a migrant parent, and remittances have 
little to do with that. In addition, a seemingly unrelated regression will be used to estimate the 
impact of parental migration on the time devoted to both work and school by the child left 
behind. Migration has no impact on time allocation of children, except in the absence of 
remittances, which can cause a child to work more and attend school fewer hours.  
             This paper uses data collected in four development regions of El Salvador to contribute 
to the literature by examining the impact of both migration and remittances on children’s 
education and labor as well as their impact on children’s time allocation.  Section II will give a 
review of the literature, Section III will explain the data and methodology, Section IV will 
show the results, and Section V will provide a discussion.  
Section II: Literature Review 
                A large sample of literature exists on the impact of migration on children left behind. 
Starting with research on budget allocation, Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) conclude in 
Guatemala households receiving remittances spend less on food, but more on education and 
housing. In terms more specific to children, Antman (2010) finds that if a Mexican father 
migrates and then returns, spending on education and durable goods for boys is lower when the 
father is present than when the father is away. The effect is insignificant for girls. For adults, 
Acosta (2007) finds that remittance recipients in El Salvador are more likely to own a business 
or be self-employed. Female labor is reduced significantly. Similarly, Damon (2009) finds that 
working hours decreases with remittances in El Salvador, while both men and women enjoy 
more leisure time.  
              An interesting component of this paper is the ample sample size of both female and 
male migrants as opposed to only male migrants in some studies. Remittance behavior of the 
migrant may vary by gender. Cortes (2010) finds that male migrants from the Philippines will 
remit more and stay away longer than females will. In Thailand, female migrants are more 
likely to remit than males (Osaki, 2009). Additionally, Thai women remit more altruistically 
than contractually, while Thai male migrants remit more contractually, meaning that women 
remit out of care for the family, while men are more likely to remit because they are legally 
required to (Vanwey, 2004). Abreigo (2009) argues that Salvadoran households with a mother 
migrant away are better off since, though they may not earn as much as males, migrant females 
will remit more consistently. Fathers send less consistently and, in some cases, stop remitting 
altogether.  
            Another point to consider is that if relocating to the United States, migrant women 
often find service jobs that pay less than those of male migrants (Cohen, 2011), which could 
affect health or schooling outcomes back home. Some economists such as Antman (2010), point 
out that a household may have better health or schooling outcomes if the father migrates, since 
the mother’s decision making power in the household will increase, thus allowing more 
expenditures to be spent on children’s wellbeing. Malone (2007) uses a two-stage Stackelberg 
game in Mexico to see how much migrants will remit and how the remittances will be spent; he 
concludes that a father’s absence will have a positive impact on investment in children’s 
schooling while a mother’s absence has no impact.            
           There are two forms in which previous literature has examined the impact of migration 
and outcomes of children left behind. The first manner looks to consider effects when a parent 
or other household member has migrated. The second way generally uses a dummy variable 
simply stating whether or not the child’s household receives remittances. Not all households 
with a migrant away receive remittances, and not all recipient households necessarily have a 
migrant member. Thus, results can vary depending on which independent variable is being 
used.      
             Beginning with schooling for children with a migrant parent, Antman (2010) measures 
time allocation of children (like this study). She shows that Mexican children, especially boys, 
will experience a decline in schooling and increase in work outside of the home if their father 
migrates. Also in Mexico, McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) find that a household having a 
migrant member lowers the chances for both boys and girls of completing high school and 
increases their chances of entering the labor force.  
               In Peru, Robles and Oropesa (2011) measure household risk of migration and find that 
having a household member migrate creates disruption and has a negative effect on children’s 
schooling.  Hanson and Woodruff (2003) from Mexico show that children in migrant 
households will significantly complete fewer years of school. In addition, interestingly they find 
that the migrant from the household is correlated with more schooling for children with 
mothers with lower education levels. 
             However, Mansuri (2006) finds in Pakistan that children will finish more years of 
school, more so for girls, if they live in a household with a migrant living abroad. A reason for 
different results than results from Latin America is likely that migration in Pakistan is more 
seasonal while migration in Latin America is more permanent. Another possible reason for 
mixed results in the literature could be that it commonly uses the migration variable as a 
dummy if there is a migrant from the household, while others simply identify if a child’s father 
resides abroad (particularly in the cases in Mexico).  
            Most similar to this study, Acosta (2011) does include the gender of the migrant in the 
study in El Salvador (though not necessarily the parent of a school age child); he discovers 
using ordinary least squares and household fixed effects, that female migration likely reduces 
child labor in domestic and non-domestic activities, while male migration stimulates it. 
Contrastingly, female migration will reduce the likelihood that a child stays in school, while 
male migration does not impact schooling. His study is unique in that he disaggregates the 
sample of children depending on age, obtaining results for children ages 6-11 and 12-18. Unlike 
this study, Acosta finds that a female migrant from the household will reduce the likelihood of a 
younger child being in school. His key finding is that female migration will reduce the 
likelihood of a child performing non-domestic labor, which he suggests is not driven by 
remittances from female migrants, but alternative possible explanations. 
             Acosta’s paper is most similar to this study in that it measures the likelihood of children 
attending school or working in El Salvador, yet it has different results than those of this study. 
Acosta’s variables of interest are if the household has a migrant member and a male migrant or 
female migrant member in separate regressions, but his study does not include the relationship 
of the migrant to the child, while this study has information on migrant’s relationship to the 
children as well as their basic living information in their destination location. This paper uses 
instrumental variable and seemingly unrelated regression estimations to observe the effects of 
parental migration and receiving remittances on children.           
         There can be a noticeable difference for a child’s educational outcome if an older sibling 
migrates or if a parent migrates and remits. For this reason, the literature focusing on 
remittances may likely have more mixed results. Migration may increase or decrease children’s 
school enrollment, depending if the income effects from remittances offset the effects of 
household disruptions (Hanson & Woodruff, 2003). Contrasting to the previously mentioned 
research in Mexico, Malone (2007) finds that a father’s absence due to migration is likely to 
have a positive impact on children’s schooling. This makes sense when Malone shows that, as a 
result of remittances, women are more likely to see education as one of the primary uses of the 
extra income from abroad.  
              Funkhouser (1992) explores the behavior of remitters and found some key conclusions: 
time since migration is negatively correlated with the amount remitted; a migrant will remit 
more if he or she left his or her spouse behind, and education is negatively correlated with the 
likelihood of remitting, but of the remitters, more educated migrants will remit larger amounts. 
He also finds significant evidence in Nicaragua that remittances will increase self-employment, 
especially for males.  
            Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) use a Cox Proportional Hazards Model to detect the 
likelihood of a child leaving school in El Salvador, and found that remittances have a negative 
effect on schooling, especially in rural areas. However, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010) 
examine the impact of remittances on school attendance in the Dominican Republic and observe 
that girls and younger children, in general, benefit the most from remittances, but schooling is 
negatively affected when the sample is expanded to include children with family members 
abroad. In a similar study in Haiti, Amuedo-Dorantes et. al (2008) also found that remittances 
will increase school attendance. These cases generally show that remittances improve 
schooling outcomes of children, depending on the relationship of the migrant to the child. Not 
recognizing if the child is the migrant’s son or daughter can mislead the outcome of children’s 
schooling from migration and remittances. It is very possible that a household receives 
remittances from distant relatives or even friends.   
                This paper looks at the impact of migration on education of children left behind using 
evidence from El Salvador to examine the impact of migration on a child’s education and labor. 
Most literature focuses on either migration or remittances. Papers use the variable of interest 
as either a dummy indicating if the child has a migrant parent or migrant member from the 
household or a binary variable for if the child lives in a home that receives remittances. It 
appears that more positive impacts are found when the variable of interest is living in a 
remittance receiving household; results are more mixed if the variable of interest is having a 
migrant parent of living in a household with a migrant member. However, this paper attempt s 
to distinguish the difference between the impact of migration and impact of remittances on 
children left behind in El Salvador by measuring children’s years of school completed and time 
allocation.   
Section III: Data and Methodology 
Data: 
         The data comes from a survey taken in 2012 in four different areas of development 
programs (ADPs), regions corresponding to the mapping of World Vision’s child sponsorship 
program, and includes twenty nine different communities in El Salvador. The choice for 
communities was made according to recent donations policies in the communities by World 
Vision, and is unrelated to migration.  The survey has more than 900 households with 2171 
children ages 6-16 for this study. The key components of the survey are health, education and 
household characteristics, but questions related to migration are included.  Questions in the 
migration section include if the child has a migrant parent, the migrant’s gender, location, time 
since migration, occupation, and if he or she has sent aid back to the household in the previous 
year. In addition, the survey also asks if the household has any other migrant members away 
and if they have sent aid in the past year.       
           The survey also consisted of a time use diary (TUD), which the head of household was 
asked to fill out for one child in the household between the ages of 6 and 12. Parents could 
mark how much time their children spend at school, working, doing chores, doing homework, 
collecting wood or water, sleeping, playing, or other. If a child in the household had a migrant 
parent away, the head of household was asked to fill out the TUD specifically for that child. 
Although only one TUD was distributed per household, it was still filled out for 718 children, 
including 120 children with migrant parents. Summary statistics are compared between TUD 
participant and non-participants ages 6-12 and no significant differences are found, suggesting 
that selection of TUD participants was random except for children with migrant parents who 
were purposefully chosen.  
Methodology: 
            The goal is to observe and estimate the effect of parental migration and remittances on 
children’s schooling. Thus a simple estimation equation is used measuring years of school 
completed by a child: 
1.) Sif = α + βMigrantParentGenderi +  χ’Xif + εif 
where S represents the outcome variable schooling for child i living in household f.  
MigrantParentGenderi is a dummy indicating whether the child has a parent who has migrated. 
It will be specified whether any parent, or specifically the mother, father, or both parents of the 
child migrated. The vector Xif  is set to include all variables that are considered to determine a 
child’s potential educational outcomes. These factors include child characteristics such as age 
and gender. Characteristics of the household also account for children’s schooling such as the 
number of children in the household, a dummy indicating if there is a child aged zero to five, 
and the years of schooling completed by the head of the household. The number of children in a 
home can influence the investment in education for a child. Similarly, the presence of a young 
child or baby between the ages of zero and five may potentially change the expected role of a 
child in the household since time of an adult’s time spent working may change. Also, since 
wealth plays a factor in labor and schooling for a child, a proxy indicating the wealth level of 
the household is used, which in this case will be a dummy specifying if the household has 
electrical service.  
           Additional controls will be used to measure the impact on children’s schooling. 
Employment status of the head of household can influence a child’s school attendance (Amuedo-
Dorantes & Pozo, 2010). Also, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) argue that the order of birth of a 
child in a family can influence the investment that is put into that child’s education; this paper 
uses a dummy indicating if the child is the oldest.  Since this paper has acknowledged that 
female decision making power may increase if a male migrates, which can affect the outcome of 
interest, gender of the head of the household is also controlled for (Acosta 2011). It is assumed 
that the migrants left for the United States, but of the population of migrant parents, there is a 
notable amount of migrants who migrated to another location within El Salvador. This could 
have a different effect on a child’s outcomes since the risk of migration is smaller and the child 
will likely see the migrant parent more frequently; therefore, another control is used for if the 
migrant is in El Salvador instead of the United States. 
             This paper also investigates the impact of migration on time allotted to school and to 
work in a given week.  Since time working takes away from school time and vice versa, the 
standard errors of these outcomes will be correlated.  For this reason, using the TUD, a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation will be used, which can also be written as: 
2.) Yih = Xihβh + uih                              h = 1, … , H and i=1, … , N 
Equation (2) shows that child i can spend time h working or schooling, where Yih is the child’s 
time spent for one activity (either school or work) and H is fixed for any value of 24 or lower 
since there can only be 24 hours in a day. Since there is a correlation between the standard 
errors, they will be adjusted instead of the coefficients (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Schooling 
hours include attending school and doing homework, and work includes household chores, 
collecting food or water, or any other form of work; these variables are multiplied by 5 to 
interpret on a weekly basis. Equation (2) will be applied using both parental migration and 
other controls for determining a child’s schooling in the vector X. Lastly, this paper will divide 
children into subsamples of children in recipient households and non-recipient households to 
see how extra income for the family affects schooling outcomes when a child has a migrant 
parent away. 
Endogoneity 
           It is imperative to address the issue that there is an observable bias in the decision for a 
household member to migrate. A migrant household may vary in terms of motivation, ability, 
income, or concern for their children’s well-being. Therefore there is a need for an instrumental 
variable. Previous migration studies have used historical state-level migration data as an 
instrument to predict a household’s networks in the destination and potential migration 
behavior (Hanson & Woodruff, 2003; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2006). The access to migration 
networks can ease migration costs by creating access to information about the US, obtaining 
employment, and housing; households with stronger networks will be more likely to send a 
migrant (Hanson & Woodruff, 2003).  
             This study does not have strong variation across Salvadoran regions, since it was not a 
national level survey, but does include questions on the characteristics of the migrant which 
infer strength of the migrants’ networks. Working with the time since emigration helps to 
provide the best instrument. El Salvador saw great emigration rates due to the civil war 
conflict from 1980 to 1992, but even after the war ended, migration has continued strong, 
suggesting that migrants have been taking advantage of migration networks that had been 
created (Menjivar, 2007).  The introduction of this paper notes that the population of 
Salvadorans in the United States nearly doubled from 2000 to 2010. Lindstom and Lopez 
Ramirez (2010) write that migration can be divided into three phases: the pioneer stage, the 
takeoff or early adaptive stage, and the mature or late adopter stage. In the pioneer stage, 
migration is more selective, since the costs and risks are higher and incentives for migration 
may be more limited. In the second stage, migration is facilitated by social networks and is no 
longer an individual but a social phenomenon; as migration spreads, costs become lower and 
the number of migrants continued to increase. El Salvador is in this stage and labor market 
conditions at the time and destination of migration for their particular occupation can be used 
as an Instrument Variable (IV), implying that migration decisions are encouraged through 
networking. Other papers have used labor market conditions in the United States as IV’s for 
migration remittances (Antman, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes et. 
al, 2008). Two instruments will be used for this study: the average wage earnings per 
occupation for location of the migrant at the time of migration, along with the employment rate 
at the time of migration in the migrant’s respective location, gathered from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). The wages are adjusted with the level of inflation. These instruments comply 
with the exclusion rule since they will highly influence the chances of a person migrating in the 
first stage, but are not correlated with a child’s education or labor outcomes.  
 Section IV: Results 
              The summary statistics can explain a lot about behavior of households and their 
propensity to send a migrant. Table 1 shows that 14% of the children in the total sample have 
at least one migrant parent, and of those migrant parents, about 80% send remittances back 
home. Nearly a third of the children live in a household with any migrant, whether it’s a parent 
or another member of the household, and 20% of the children live in homes that receive 
remittances from any source. 90% of the children in the sample currently attend school. 
Interestingly, there are statistically significant differences between children who have migrant 
parents and those who do not.  For example a higher percentage of children with migrant 
parents are enrolled in school, live in homes with electricity (used as a wealth proxy), and have 
more educated parents. Non migrant households are significantly less likely to have a child 
aged zero to five in the home. This makes sense since migration decisions may be based on the 
circumstances of children living at home, however these differences accentuate the need for an 
instrument variable. 
            Table 2 examines details of the parents who have migrated. Part a shows that of the 
children with at least one migrant parent, 80% of the children have at least a father away, 35% 
have at least a mother away, while for 17% of the sample of migrant children both parents are  
away. All of the parents migrated to the United States except for 13% who migrated within El 
Salvador. Part b of Table 2 compares outcomes statistics depending on the gender of the 
migrant paper. Instead of merging the sample of children with both parents away, a third 
separate category is used for children who have both parents away as a result of migration. In 
Table 2b, the descriptive statistics do not appear vary different across the gender of the parent. 
It is worth noting that the entire sample of 54 children with both parents away currently 
attends school. There also appears to be a significant difference between the completed years of 
school outcome at the 90% confidence level, Children do appear to have more years of 
completed schooling if the migrant is female, yet this difference does not take age of the child 
into account. Statistically, children with migrant mothers complete almost a year more of 
school than children with migrant fathers. These differences in Table 2b exclude the sample of 
children with both parents away. There is no statistically significant difference in the time use 
variables between children with migrant parents and those who do not, but table 2a shows that 
children of migrants in El Salvador on average spend more time attending school or doing 
homework and less time working, while children with no migrant parents away on average 
spend more time doing chores or some form of work and less time studying.     
              Next are results of completed schooling for all children in the sample. All estimations 
are estimated using the labor market conditions of the location along with the likely wage for 
the migrant upon arriving in the United States as instruments, and the IV’s are estimated using 
second stage least squares. With years of completed schooling as the dependent variable Table 
3 shows the impact of having a parent has migrated. These estimates are clustered at the 
household level, which includes 976 family clusters for robustness purposes. Column 1 shows 
that a child will complete 0.25 more years of school than children with no migrant parent. It is 
also important to note that the test for endogoneity is 5.556 and the Hansen J-stat for over-
identification is 0.573, verifying that the instruments used are valid and not over-identifying.1 
The coefficient for child of a migrant stays small in columns 1 through 7, varying from 0.19 to 
0.25 depending on the controls but maintains its significance. Also important, the instruments 
remain valid in columns 1 through 5. Interestingly, in Column 5, a child with a parent who has 
migrated to another location in El Salvador instead of to the United States will complete nearly 
half of a year less schooling, and that number is significant. Columns 6 and 7 show similar 
results using OLS estimations.  
                The next step in identification is to understand what role remittances may have in a 
child with a migrant parent’s increase in completed schooling. In addition, it is important to see 
the differences between outcomes of children with migrant mothers and the outcomes of 
children with migrant fathers. Similar to Table 3, Table 4 shows the effect of having a mother 
                                                          
1
 The null hypothesis for the Endogoneity test is that the variable being instrumented is exogenous and not 
endogenous. With clustering, the test for endogeneity is lower than the Wu-Hausman F test which has the same 
null hypothesis. The null hypothesis for the Hansen J test is that the instruments used are valid and the model is 
not over-identified.  
has migrated versus not having a mother who has migrated. Column 1 indicates that a child 
with a migrant mother will complete more than an entire year of education with a significant t-
stat. The test for endogeneity and Hansen test confirm the same instruments’ validity. In order 
to identify the impact of remittances, the children are divided into subsamples. Column 2 
includes the children in households that receive remittances (whether from that parent or from 
another relative) and Column 3 contains children in households who live in a household that do 
not receive remittances from any source. Children living in a home with a mother migrant will 
finish more than a year of school, while children in non-remittance homes will finish more than 
2 more years of school; however neither of these numbers is significant. In all three columns of 
Table 4 the instruments used stay valid.  
             Table 5 uses the same method as Table 4 but uses the dummy for children with a father 
migrant as the new variable of interest, still clustering at the household level. In Column 1, 
children with father migrants will complete 0.39 more years of school than children without a 
father migrant. Results lose significance, however, when children are split into the remittance 
and non-remittance subsamples. The instruments are noticeably strong in Column 1, but lose 
their validity in Column 3 when only children in remittance receiving households are included 
in the sample. 
              Additionally, outcomes are used to measure the impact on children’s education when 
both parents have migrated. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that a child with both parents away 
will complete more than a year and a half more schooling than the rest of the sample. Although 
the results are large in Columns 2 and 3, they are not significant. The instruments remain 
effective in all three of the columns. It can be concluded that remittances have little influence 
on a child’s education. However, this likely implies that it is not the impact of remittances that 
influence schooling, but the other factors such as wealth, parental education, and other 
household characteristics correlated with education, which are likely correlated with migration 
since there are many household factors can cause a household to have a migrant member. 
              Next, a seemingly unrelated regression estimation is used to measure the impact of 
migration on children’s time devoted to work and school. This method still estimates the same 
instrument variables using second stage least squares. Table 7 displays the effects on work and 
study time. Columns 1 and 2 includes results for the entire sample of children who participated 
in TUD, and it can be seen that having a migrant parent has little impact on children’s time 
used for studying or working. A son or daughter of a migrant will work 0.31 hours less and 
study 1.07 hours more per week. As anticipated, children with parents who have migrated will 
work more and study less, but these figures are not significant.2 
         Similarly to the method that years of completed schooling is observed by putting children 
in recipient and non-recipient homes in Tables 4 through 6, Table 7 also includes subsamples of 
children in households that receive and do not receive remittances. The absolute values of the 
coefficients are larger for children with migrant parents in Columns 3 and 4, but still not 
significant. Columns 5 and 6 show the amount of hours studying or working for children in 
non-recipient homes. In the absence of remittances, working hours change from negative to 
positive and school hours change from positive to negative. Children with migrant parents that 
live in homes with no remittances will work nearly 4 and a half more hours per week. This 
value is significant at the 95% level. Children with migrant parents that live in homes with no 
remittances will spend almost 5 hours less attending school or doing homework per work than 
children that do not have any migrant parents nor live in non-recipient households, and this 
coefficient holds at the 90% level.  
Section V: Discussion 
              It can be inferred that while parental migration is correlated with a positive impact on 
children’s schooling, it is unlikely that remittances have little effect on the years of schooling 
outcome, suggesting that other characteristics that influence education outcomes may also 
influence a household having a migrant member, such as wealth or education of the adults in a 
household. This paper uses labor market conditions in the United States at the time of 
migration as instruments for the likelihood of a parent migrating suggests that a parent will 
make migration decisions based on networks. Children with migrant parents will complete 
more schooling than children with non-migrant parents, and the difference is stronger if the 
migrant leaving a child behind is a mother. The same factors that influence children’s education 
likely influence migration. Hence data from the United States is used as an IV to show that 
migration also relies on networking and US economic conditions.  
               Using seemingly unrelated regressions, it is evident that migration has insignificant 
on time allocation, except for children who live in homes that do not receive any remittances. 
                                                          
2
 Because the sample size of children with migrant parents who participated in TUD is only 120, it is doubtful that 
results comparing the gender of the migrant parent will be robust. Therefor seemingly unrelated regression with 
the gender of the migrant parent are not included in this paper. 
In the absence of remittances, children with migrant parents will put more time into work and 
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Table 2a: Statistics on Migrant Population 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Have sent home aid 296 0.83 0.38 
Mother Migrant 296 0.17 0.38 
Father Migrant 296 0.65 0.48 
Both Parents Migrated 296 0.18 0.39 
Migrated within El Salvador 296 0.14 0.35 
 


















2b. Statistics by gender of migrant parent 
 
If Mother Migrated 
  
If Father Migrated 
     
Both Parents Migrated 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Diff t test 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Years of completed schooling 54 4.65 2.53 
 




54 4.17 2.63 
Currently attends school 54 0.98 0.14 
 




54 1.00 0.00 
Total hours per week working 24 8.12 6.81 
 




22 6.34 5.49 
Total School hours per week 24 28.14 6.36 
 




22 29.62 5.21 
Parent has sent home aid 54 0.83 0.38 
 




54 0.91 0.29 
Table 3. Migration and Completed School 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 





















        
Child of migrant parent 0.250*** 0.196** 0.203** 0.192** 0.250** 0.208** 0.215** 
 (2.74) (2.11) (2.17) (2.06) (2.48) (2.30) (2.18) 
Male -0.0484 -0.048 -0.045 -0.045 -0.042 -0.049 -0.043 
 (-0.78) (-0.77) (-0.72) (-0.73) (-0.68) (-0.79) (-0.70) 
Age  0.420*** 0.421*** 0.418*** 0.422*** 0.418*** 0.422*** 0.420*** 
 (4.59) (4.60) (4.57) (4.61) (4.57) (5.15) (5.13) 
Age squared 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (2.29) (2.27) (2.31) (2.18) (2.21) (2.71) (2.63) 
# of children in HH -0.036 -0.033 -0.034 -0.0101 -0.0127 -0.036 -0.0123 
 (-1.40) (-1.26) (-1.32) (-0.38) (-0.47) (-1.50) (-0.48) 
Zero-five year   -0.130* -0.128* -0.123* -0.158** -0.164** -0.131* -0.165** 
 (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.67) (-2.06) (-2.13) (-1.91) (-2.35) 
Educ. of head  0.146*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.147*** 0.157*** 
 (10.15) (10.42) (10.46) (10.36) (10.30) (12.36) (12.85) 
Electricity in HH 0.188*** 0.173** 0.176** 0.177** 0.173** 0.192*** 0.175*** 
 (2.59) (2.39) (2.44) (2.47) (2.40) (2.86) (2.60) 
Male head of HH  -0.186*** -0.225*** -0.200*** -0.197***  -0.200*** 
  (-2.68) (-3.05) (-2.69) (-2.64)  (-2.80) 
Head employed   0.0864 0.0745 0.072  0.0704 
   (1.13) (0.98) (0.95)  (1.00) 
Oldest child in HH    0.199** 0.201**  0.202*** 
    (2.51) (2.54)  (2.80) 








IV Test for enodogeneity 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
 







































































Constant -2.973*** -2.876*** -2.894*** -3.064*** -3.021*** -2.980*** -3.027*** 
 (-6.20) (-6.00) (-6.03) (-6.25) (-6.15) (-6.59) (-6.63) 
        
Observations 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 
R-squared 0.656 0.657 0.658 0.659 0.659 0.656 0.660 
 
                     Table 4. Mother Migration and Completed School 



















    
Child of migrant mother 1.382** 1.054* 2.623* 
 (2.45) (1.76) (1.85) 
Male -0.031 -0.029 -0.014 
 (-0.49) (-0.23) (-0.20) 
Age  0.417*** 0.366* 0.421*** 
 (4.55) (1.96) (4.01) 
Age squared 0.010** 0.015* 0.009* 
 (2.17) (1.66) (1.72) 
# of children in HH -0.001 -0.024 0.018 
 (-0.05) (-0.54) (0.55) 
Zero-five year   -0.167** -0.038 -0.196** 
 (-2.18) (-0.23) (-2.28) 
Educ. of head  0.159*** 0.084*** 0.178*** 
 (10.36) (2.60) (10.19) 
Electricity in HH 0.163** 0.187 0.143* 
 (2.25) (0.97) (1.81) 
Male head of HH -0.220*** -0.169 -0.230*** 
 (-2.98) (-1.13) (-2.75) 
Head employed 0.057 -0.105 0.0958 
 (0.76) (-0.70) (1.10) 
Oldest child in HH 0.219*** -0.0531 0.291*** 
 (2.75) (-0.33) (3.17) 








IV Test for enodogeneity 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
 













































Constant -3.034*** -2.381*** -3.188*** 
 (-6.11) (-2.62) (-5.52) 
    
Observations 2,171 445 1,726 
R-squared 0.657 0.705 0.646 
 
                     Table 5. Father Migration and Completed School 



















    
Child of migrant father 0.393** 0.413 0.515* 
 (2.41) (1.56) (1.79) 
Male -0.044 -0.059 -0.033 
 (-0.71) (-0.43) (-0.47) 
Age  0.416*** 0.357* 0.424*** 
 (4.53) (1.87) (4.08) 
Age squared 0.010** 0.017* 0.009* 
 (2.24) (1.77) (1.72) 
# of children in HH -0.016 -0.068 0.0107 
 (-0.59) (-1.48) (0.32) 
Zero-five year   -0.167** -0.029 -0.207** 
 (-2.17) (-0.17) (-2.41) 
Educ. of head  0.156*** 0.083*** 0.174*** 
 (10.24) (2.59) (10.07) 
Electricity in HH 0.173** 0.201 0.165** 
 (2.40) (0.96) (2.12) 
Male head of HH -0.186** -0.038 -0.221*** 
 (-2.44) (-0.21) (-2.65) 
Head employed 0.073 -0.059 0.099 
 (0.95) (-0.37) (1.14) 
Oldest child in HH 0.189** -0.126 0.265*** 
 (2.36) (-0.70) (2.93) 








IV Test for enodogeneity 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
 















































Constant -3.004*** -2.412*** -3.156*** 
 (-6.11) (-2.58) (-5.55) 
    
Observations 2,171 445 1,726 
R-squared 0.657 0.691 0.652 
 
                 Table 6. Completed School if both parents migrate 



















    
Both parents of child migrated 1.367** 1.186 6.762 
 (2.16) (1.58) (1.24) 
Male -0.044 -0.050 -0.029 
 (-0.70) (-0.37) (-0.41) 
Age  0.426*** 0.399** 0.432*** 
 (4.65) (2.01) (4.12) 
Age squared 0.009** 0.014 0.00811 
 (2.11) (1.47) (1.61) 
# of children in HH -0.012 -0.055 0.016 
 (-0.42) (-1.11) (0.47) 
Zero-five year   -0.147* 0.063 -0.200** 
 (-1.88) (0.37) (-2.32) 
Educ. of head  0.156*** 0.082** 0.176*** 
 (10.17) (2.54) (10.13) 
Electricity in HH 0.179** 0.265 0.140* 
 (2.49) (1.29) (1.75) 
Male head of HH -0.207*** -0.108 -0.245*** 
 (-2.78) (-0.70) (-2.90) 
Head employed 0.084 0.011 0.096 
 (1.09) (0.07) (1.10) 
Oldest child in HH 0.229*** 0.0412 0.297*** 
 (2.85) (0.23) (3.19) 




Number of Household Clusters 
 
  
IV Test for enodogeneity 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
 





































Constant -3.077*** -2.731*** -3.197*** 
 (-6.23) (-2.75) (-5.57) 
    
Observations 2,171 445 1,726 
R-squared 0.654 0.685 0.640 
 
 
 Table 7 Migration and Children’s Time Allocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















School hours per 
week (Household  
does not receive 
remittances) 
       
Child of a migrant  -0.314 1.070 -1.655 2.282* 4.467** -4.879* 
 (-0.42) (1.10) (-1.58) (1.83) (2.35) (-1.91) 
Male -0.910* -1.766*** -1.833* -0.825 -0.638 -1.959*** 
 (-1.84) (-2.73) (-1.92) (-0.73) (-1.13) (-2.58) 
Age  0.284 4.533** -0.920 -4.354 0.153 6.993*** 
 (0.17) (2.04) (-0.25) (-1.00) (0.08) (2.74) 
Age squared 0.034 -0.213* 0.120 0.259 0.0381 -0.342** 
 (0.38) (-1.82) (0.61) (1.12) (0.38) (-2.55) 
 # of children in HH 0.670*** -0.233 1.736*** 0.364 0.372 -0.529 
 (2.67) (-0.71) (3.83) (0.68) (1.26) (-1.33) 
Zero-five year in HH   -0.678 0.564 -1.318 0.0692 -0.178 0.914 
 (-1.19) (0.76) (-1.24) (0.06) (-0.27) (1.03) 
Educ. of head  -0.262*** 0.0593 -0.569*** -0.0525 -0.185* 0.0745 
 (-2.95) (0.51) (-3.23) (-0.25) (-1.81) (0.55) 
Electricity in HH -1.401*** 2.015*** -2.442** 1.329 -1.348** 2.133*** 
 (-2.61) (2.87) (-1.98) (0.91) (-2.27) (2.68) 
Male head of HH -0.951* 0.322 0.423 -2.049 -1.183* 0.537 
 (-1.68) (0.43) (0.36) (-1.49) (-1.85) (0.63) 
Head employed 1.410** -1.873*** 0.422 1.146 1.530** -2.674*** 
 (2.56) (-2.59) (0.37) (0.85) (2.46) (-3.20) 
Oldest child in HH 0.309 -0.977 2.197** -2.765** -0.349 -0.825 
 (0.53) (-1.28) (1.96) (-2.08) (-0.52) (-0.92) 
Migrant in El 
Salvador 
-1.237 -0.150 -1.940 -1.854 -4.902 7.261* 
 (-0.75) (-0.07) (-1.04) (-0.84) (-1.52) (1.68) 
Constant 4.241 4.434 8.617 44.33** 5.179 -5.908 
 (0.54) (0.43) (0.51) (2.20) (0.59) (-0.50) 
       
Observations 718 718 162 162 556 556 
R-squared 0.111 0.055 0.281 0.114 0.098 0.070 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
